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A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE CHANGES
WROUGHT IN VIRGINIA SECURITY LAW
BY THE ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 9
OF THE U.C.C.
INTRODUCTION

It can probably be said without exaggeration that with the exception
of the introduction of code pleading, the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code has caused one of the most extensive changes in
Virginia law since the founding of the Commonwealth.
Naturally, with such an extensive piece of legislation taking effect
at the beginning of 1966, all attorneys who have any clients having
significant interests in areas covered by the Code must re-orient themselves and their clients to operate efficiently under the Code. As Professor Woltz has stated, "Lawyers are not worried so much by their
ignorance of the law, but rather by the law they know that's been
changed." 1
While the general concern over procedures under the Code applies
to all nine tides, the greatest interest seems to center around the provisions of the sections covering security financing-Article 9. Many
members of the Bar have noted this concern. 2 The major problem
seems to arise, however, from the feeling held apparently by many
practicing attorneys that "Article 9 is completely novel" ' and "implied
with this objection is the further objection that lawyers would find
article 9 foreign and would have to learn security law all over again4
[sic]." In addition, this concern seems to be compounded with the idea
prevalent within many sections of the Bar that any changes in security
law cannot do anything but make more difficult, an already difficult
area of the law.
In order to analyze the causes of this concern and to help provide
the practicing attorney with a working understanding of security
law under Article 9 this paper will attempt to summarize the changes
that have been wrought in Virginia security law by the adoption of
Article 9 of the U.C.C.
1. Professor Charles K. Woltz, "Introduction to the Code," Speech, Seminar on the

Code, Sponsored by the joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the Virginia State Bar Association, Richmond, October 14, 1965.
2. See Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the Code,
60 MICH. L. REv. 591 (1962).
3. "Time to Adopt the U. C. C." (Report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Committee to the Governor and General Assembly of Va.) 1963.
4. Ibid.
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CONCEPTUAL CHANGES

For the practicing attorney to develop a truly working understanding
of security law under the Code, it is necessary that he understand the
basic conceptual changes that permeate Article 9. Without this understanding, the concern over the changes wrought by Article 9 could
well prove to be correct. With it, on the other hand, all of security
law falls into a homogeneous easily followed system.
Under the old security law there was no philosophy which would
or could allow one to form an intelligent overall concept of this particular field of law. Anyone dealing in security law to any extent
had more or less to memorize a number of totally unconnected, and
often opposing rules, forms, and statutory requirements5 The adoption of the U.C.C. completely changes this situation, by inherently
providing an overall conceptual basis for operation under the Code:

i.e., To unite all consensual security interests in personal property under
one easily comprehendible, and broadly flexible sets of laws TO the
extent that financing transactions of this nature may be used to their
fullest capabilities,and that the intent of the parties may be best assured
of being fully effected.
THE UNIFYING OF ALL CONSENSUAL

INTERESTS UNDER THE CODE

The first important part of this conceptual basis is the idea that all
security law be brought, with the exception of a few specifically excluded situations, 6 together under one section of the Virginia Code; 7
and while this section must be read in pari materia with all other sections of the Code," anyone with a reasonable understanding of the Code
can be sure that he has before him all the law dealing with his particular interest.
5. Under prior Virginia law it is almost impossible for anyone to obtain a completely
accurate and complete command of security law without extensive experience in the
particular field due to the fact that it was so widely scattered throughout the various
volumes of the Virginia Code. Thus, the attorney desiring such a command of security
law had for example to be familiar with sec. 55-88 & 89 (conditional sales); sec. 55-96
(Recordation requirements for Deeds of trust and Chattel Mortgages); sees. 43-44--43-61
(agricultural deeds of trust); sec. 43-27 & 43-28 (crop leins); sec. 55-88.1 and 55-96.1
(security interests in connection with the business of a contractor, logger or sawmiller);
sec. 55-100 (security interests in civil aircraft); sec. 6-550-6-568 (Trust receipts); secs.
55-143-55-150 (Factor's Liens); sec. 11-5-11-7 (assignments of accounts receivable) and
sec. 61-1-61-58 (Field warehousing).
6. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.9-104 (1950).

7. Id., Tide 8.9.
8. Professor Woltz, supra note 1.

1966]

ARTICLE

9 OF U.C.C.

In addition to the inclusion of most of the presently used security
devices,9 the Code is also intended to cover all consensual security interests that might be developed in the future,'- thus assuring a stability
and security in the area of such commercial transactions hitherto unknown under a system where each new device required its own period
of court interpretation and development before those using it could
be sure that their intent would be effectuated.
THE INTENT CONCEPT UNDER THE CODE

Probably the most important aspect of the new conceptual basis of
the Code is the proposition that all sections of the security law should
be read in the light which would best effect the intent of the parties
to the agreement, rather than according to the old formal distinctions
and the minute technicalities which usually depended. on the form of
the security interest, and which often served to defeat the interest where
because of accident or ignorance they were not strictly complied with."'
In line with this concept, the Code makes three operational changes
which carry throughout Article 9:
First, if Article 9 applies it does not matter in whom or where the
12
title to the secured property may be.

Secondly, under the Code, there are, in several instances, specific
self-correcting clauses which provide that in almost all cases where
the parties intended that their actions have a certain effect, both parties
dealing in good faith, the Code allows such intent takes precedence
over the otherwise applicable procedures under the Code. Thus:
[t] he article does not in terms abolish security devices. The con(..

ditional sale for example is not prohibited; but even though it is used,
9. See supra note , for specific exclusions.
10. ...
when it is found that a security interest... was intended, this article applies
regardless of the form of the transaction or the name by which the parties may have
christened it. The list of Security devices in Sec. (2) [of 8.9-102] is illustrative only;
other old devices as well as any new ones are included so long as the requisite intent
is found"-VA. CoDE ANx., op. cit., sec. 8.9-102, official comment.

11. See for example: Corbett v. Riddle, 209 F. 811, 814-815. (4th C.C.A. 1913); The
Henry S,4 F. Supp. 953, 954 (ED. Va. 1933); Mullins v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 547, 109
S.E. 420 (1921); Ambler v. D. Warwick & Co, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 194, 212-13 (1829);

Robert's Adm'r v. Cocke's Ex'r 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 121 (1822) which has controlled the
Virginia law in this area until the Code goes into effect.
12. "If Article 9 applies.., it applies without regard to the form or device 4hosen
[and] the technical distinction [formerly in the law as to who held the title] .. .is
immaterial ... [under the code]:' VA. CoDE ANN., op. cit., sec. 8.9-202.
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the rules of this Article [to the extent that the former technicalities
14
and distinctions will not defeat the intent of the parties] -3 will govern.

Similiarly, where the parties in good faith attempted to meet the recording requirements, and through ignorance or accident, failed to do so,
their intent to create a valid security interest would not be defeated."
Thirdly, following the general objective that the Code be as simple
as possible, and that the intent of the parties not be defeated by the
formal distinctions and/or requirements characteristic of prior law,
Article 918 has taken the major step of abandoning the conceptual dividing lines between the traditional security devices.l1
Now the approach is functional, i.e., rights, duties, priorities, turn on
what purpose the security was intended to serve rather than the conceptual form of the security, e.g., having the controversy turn upon
whether a particular instrument was a chattel mortgage or a conditional
sale does not happen under Article 9.18
SPECIFIC APPLICATION-SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES

It is not of course, possible for a paper of this scope to discuss in
detail, or even mention in passing, every minute question which may
arise in secured financing under the Code in a given situation. Indeed,
it will not even be possible to recognize every area of security law that
has or has not been changed by Article 9 until there is time to see
what attitude the courts will take in the course of its interpretation. 19
13. As Henson pointed out in his article "Secured Financing Under U.C.C.," The
Bus. Lawyer 337, 1963 ". . . since legal security is made so simple under the Code,
no purpose would be served by recognizing equitable [or oral] security interests .. .
and a great deal of stability can be achieved by this simple requirement.
14. VA. CoD ANN., § 8.9-102 (1950).
15. VA. CoDE ANN., § 8.9-401 (2) (1950).

16. See supranote 14.
17. "Under this article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based
largely on form are not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to
create security interests in personal property, and fixtures, and the single term 'security
interests' substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms which has grown up at common law and over a hundred year accretion of statutes."-American Law Institute,
UNioRM COMMERciAL CODE 1958 TExr AND COMMENTS, p. 589.
18. "Time to Adopt the U.C.C.," supra note 3 at 28.
19. Cf. VA. CODE ANN, § 8.9-102 (1960), Official Comment. "Since prior Virginia
law has not developed in exactly the same way, it is not possible to state categorically

every aspect of Virginia law that is [and is not changed) by the U.C.C. . . . For
instance, . . . while literally within the coverage of title 8.9, statutes such as those giving
liens on the offspring of stallions, jackasses and bulls might be excluded from the U.C.C.
on the theory that there no commercial transaction is involved."
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There are, however, some major substantive changes which have been
effected by the adoption of Article 9 which are of major import; and
which must be recognized by anyone dealing at all in the area of
secured financing.
CHANGES IN TERMINOLOGY UNDER THE CODE

The first change in security law to be recognized by any attorney
attempting to readjust himself to conditions under the Code is the abandonment of the numerous formal distinctions which characterized prior
Virginia security law.2 ° That is, the Code in Article 9 has completely
done away with the need for the extensive terminology required in
dealing with security law under the prior system, and has replaced
it with its own entirely new and much less complicated vocabulary.
Ray Henson, in his excellent paper on "Secured Financing Under the
U.C.C." 21

very succinctly explains the differences:

To a large extent each of the pre-code security devices had its own
peculiar terminology, but the use of such [old terms] ...is no longer
significant to us. Instead of such old terms:
Secured party replaces mortgagee, conditional seller, entruster, factor, assignee of accounts;
debtor replaces mortgagor, conditional buyer, trustee, assignor of
accounts;
security interest replaces mortgage, "tide" in conditional sales, trust
receipts, factor's liens, and assignments of accounts;
security agreement states the arrangement between the debtor and
the secured party;
financingstatement is filed to give public notice; [and]
22
collateralis the subject of the security agreement (or sale)
THE EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS CONCEPT2
TO SECURED INTERESTS

One of the more important statutory changes wrought by the adop20. See discussion page 5.
21. Henson, Secured Financing Under the Code, 18 THE Bus Nss LAWYER 337 (1963).
22. Ibid.
23. I use the word "concept" here, because the Code does not, in Article 9, specifically
use the words "statute of frauds." The Official Comment and other commentary,
however, make it clear that that is the effect intended in sec. 8.9-203. Itshould be
noted also at this point that this should not be confused with the general statute of
frauds in sec. 8.1-206 which specifically excludes security transactions covered under
Article 9 from its provisions.
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tion of the U.C.C. is the effect of section 8.9-203 which requires that
there be a writing signed by the debtor in order for there to be an
enforceable security interest created. While this change may be minimized insofar as it may place additional burdens on the parties to a
security agreement due to the already prevalent recording requirements,2 4 it does extend the effect of the statute of frauds to all security
interests-a requirement that was not present in former Virginia law.
This change, as most of the others rendered by the adoption of the
Code, should, in the long run, make the matter of security law in Virginia less complex and more easily handled.
The only requirements for the enforceability of non-possessory security interests in cases not involving lind are a) a writing; b) the
debtor's signature, and; c) a description of the collateral or kinds of
collateral25
As to the description, it is made clear in the Code that, unlike the
very strict requirements often stipulated under prior recording acts
any description sufficient to enable a court to identify the property
subject to the agreement with reasonable assurance of accuracy will be
26
sufficient.
In this whole matter however, it is essential that the practitioner recognize that this writing requirement is in the nature of a statute of frauds
2
and is not merely for the benefit of third parties to the agreementY.
Thus:
The formal requisites found in [sec. 8.9-203] are not only conditions
to the enforceability of a security interest against third parties ....

Un-

less the secured party is in possession of the collateral, his security
interest, absent a writing which satisfies subsection (1) (b), Is not enforceable even againstthe debtor and cannot be made so on any theory
8
of Equitable mortgage. [Emphasis supplied.] 2
CHANGES EFFECTED IN THE RECORDATION REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY
TO PERFECT A SECURITY INTEREST

Another area of changes in security law of great importance for any24. VA. CODE AN., § 8.9-203 (1950).
25. Id., Official Comment.

26. Id.
27. See supra note 13.
28. VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-203 (1950).
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one operating under the Code is that involving changes in the various
recordation requirements for perfecting a given security interest.
Under the old system, the difficulty involved in making sure that a
security interest under the prior law was properly. recorded was immense, 29 since it was based solely on the character of the one security
interest which it recorded.3 0 Thus in Callahan v. Young 3 ' where the
strict requirements of the law were not met by the party seeking to file
by docketing a conditional sale contract, the court would not compel
the clerk to record the abstract and the security failed. Likewise under3
32
prior law it was required that chattel mortgages,

deeds of trusts,

3

and factor's liens- all had to be recorded in full. On the other hand
various agricultural liens were required to be docketed only,3' and
agricultural deeds of trust were left up to the creditor as to whether he
wanted them recorded in full or merely docketed, 0 and finally, it
was merely required for trust receipt financing and conditional sales
contracts that a statement of their existence be filed 37 Under the Code,
all of this is simplified to the extent that the only thing that is required
insofar as the form of the recording is concerned is that a short, uniform
financing statement be filed 38 regardless of what type of property may
be subject to the security agreement. In addition, the exact form of
the statement is explicitly laid out in the Code.39
As to the place of recordation, the Code makes changes, once again,
29. An excellent example of the confusion rendered under the old law as to filing
can be seen in the Official Comment of sec. 55-88 where it is stated that as to conditional sales of property removed into the state from other states where it was validly
recorded at the time of the agreement, Virginia law would not require re-recordation
in Virginia [see: Osmund-Barringer Co. v. Hey, 7 Va. Law Reg. N.S. 175 (1921);
C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, 970 Va. 16, 195 S.E. 659 (19 ); and Universal C. L T. Credit Corp.
v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 92 S.E. (2d) 359.] On the other hand, as to chattel mortgages or
deeds of trust or other encumbrances, if the agreement had been made in another state
where the security interest was at the time, and the property was then brought into
Virginia, the security interest would have to be re-recorded in Virginia to retain its
validity in Virginia [8 VA. CODE ANN., op. cit., sec. 55-99.]
30. VA. CODE ANx., § 8.9-402 (1950).

31. Callahan v. Young, 90 Va. 574, 576-77, 19 S.E. 163 (1894).
32. VA. CODE ANN., § 55-96 (1950).
33. Id., sec. 55-96.1.
34. Id., sec. 55-145.
35. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 43-27, 43-42, and 43-43 (1950).
36. Id, sec. 43-53.
37. VA.

CODE

38. See VA.
39. Ibid.

ANN., §§ 55-88, 55-89 (1950); and VA.

CODE ANN,

CODE

ANN, § 6-562 (1950).

§ 8.9-402 (2) (1950) for statutory form.
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only to the extent that it greatly simplifies and stabilizes the requirements. o
Under the new law there are three possible places at which a security
interest may properly be recorded, depending on the general nature of
the collateral. Briefly, any goods bought by individuals for ultimate
consumption or for farm production require recording in the county
or city of the buyer's residence; 41 goods which are, or will be, closely
related to real estate-i.e., fixtures-will follow the recording site of the
real estate;42 and all other goods-basically those bought in commerce
for further processing or resale-will be centrally recorded unless there
be only one place of business of the buyer, in which case recording will
also be required in the county or city of the buyer's resident. 3 This
scheme as to the place of recordation basically follows that set up under
prior law, with a greatly expanded emphasis on central recording (which
was formerly used only in the case of trust receipt financing.)
The only real problems that should arise under the Code in the
area of recordation, will be that of getting used to the central filing
requirement on many transactions which required only local filing
before. Thus a conditional sale of the basic equipment to set up a retail
store which once would have required only local filing to be perfected
as a security interest44 would now require central filing, and, if the
debtor had only one place of business, local filing as well.4 5
While it is possible, however, that this double recording requirement,
if left in the context of prior Virginia law, could prove extremely
troublesome, an additional change in the Code has made it almost negligible, insofar as improper recordation defeating the intended security
interest is concerned.40 Under the prior law if a security interest was
filed in the wrong place, the filing was void, and the security interest
lost unless refied in the proper place prior to its being defeated by a
40. The Official Text of the U.C.C. had 2 alternative provisions as to the place of
filing. The Virginia Code Commission, in its draft for adoption by Virginia selected
the second alternative so as to "make the fewest changes in the pattern of existing Virginia recording statutes.'-VA. CoDE ANN., sec. 8.9-401 (1950), Code Commission note.
41. VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-401 (1) (a)

(1950).

42. id., § 8.9-401 (1) (b).
43. Id., § 8.9-401 (1) (c).
44. See Newcomb v. Guthrie, 145 Va. 627, 134 S.E. 585 (1926).
45. Similar changes would be wrought in the decisions in National Cash Register Co.
v. Norfolk City Realty, 110 Va. 791, 67 S.E. 372 (1910); Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook,
109 Va. 382, 383-84, 63 S.. 1070 (1909); Groner v. Babcock Printing Press Co., 267
F. 822 (4 C.C.A. 1920).
46. -Cf. supra p. 5.
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subsequent interest or assignment.
the Code provision whereby

7

This problem is eliminated under

A filing which is made in good faith in an improper
not in all of the places required by this section [emphasis
is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as
the filing [otherwise] complied with the requirements of

place or
supplied]
to which
this title.

4S

One final change that is made by the Code in regard to the proper
recordation of security interests is the repeal of section 55-9849 which
required that any time any property which served as collateral was
moved to another city or county the agreement secured by that property
would have to be re-recorded in the latter jurisdiction within one year
after it was so removed. Under the U.C.C.5 the original filing remains
valid without such re-recordation.5 1
It might appear that under the recording scheme of the Code problems would result whenever the security interest was secured by
property which could be easily moved from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
(such as, for example, a private automobile). Under the Code, however, in such cases, the existing practice of recording security interests
in such property on the title certificate continues, and it is not necessary
52
to make any further recording to perfect any such lien.
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY; THE "FLOATING LIEN"
AND VIRGINIA'S FACTOR'S ACTS
3
One of the most glamorous and probably most "dangerous" changes1
wrought by Article 9 is the expansion of the doctrine allowing a creditor

47. Lane v. Mason, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 520, 521-22 (1834) cf.: Tokheim Oil Tank &
Pump Co. v. Fentress, 33 F. 2d 730, 733 (4 C.C.A. 1929).
48. See supranote 15.
49. VA. CODE ANN., § 55-98 (1950).
50. VA. CoDE ANN., § 8.9-401 (3) (1950).

51. What other problems this policy might raise as to the proper searching of any
such liens by subsequent lien holders, are not within the scope of this paper. It is submitted, however, that this last change may conceivably cause as many problems to a
party seeking to establish the priority of his own lien.
52 VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-401 (1950), Official Comment.

53. "The lawyer, on first reviewing Article 9 and its provisions for Sec. Int. in
future Rev. might very well think that the "millennium had arrived" .... and like any
child with a new toy ... [is] probably going to want to use this floating lien! Our
advice is don't. At least not until you can't find any other way to meet your client's
needs, and know all the [pitfalls] of Article 9's 'floating lien.' .. "
"Don't ever let laziness cause you to use the 'shot gun' approach offered by the
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to take security interests in property which may be left under the full
control of the debtor even to the extent of a valid resale to a bona fide
purchaser 54 and/or property which the debtor may as yet not even have.
This doctrine is the basis of the famous (and to many, mysterious)
"floating lien".55
Actually the concept of a "floating lien" type of security device is not
completely new in Virginia. In the Factor's Acts, 56 Virginia law recognized a concept which was very close to what is found in the Code
under the "floating lien": i.e., that is the concept of a permanent lien
on a shifting inventory. 57 The changees made by the Code under the
"floating lien" are simply the extension of this device to all security
transactions covered by the Act. Thus, while in most instances the
doctrine of Lang v. Lee5 and its more famous New York cousin, Benedict v. Ratner"0 have remained as good law in the case of most security
'floating lien'; instead, try to make use of the individual security devices offered by the
U.C.C. If you nmust use it now, you might consider thereafter periodically drafting a
new Security Agreement specifically embracing and describing the interim after-acquired
property and timing the execution of each new agreement with some new advances or
re-financing on different terms; otherwise you are taking chances on the ultimate
verdict on U.C.C. 9-108:' Burns, Snead & Speidel, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE U.C.C.
The Michie Co, Charlottesville, 1964.
54. In the Official Comment relating to § 8.9-205 it is specifically stated that "This §
provides that a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent by reason of liberty in the
debtor to dispose of the collateral without being required to account for proceeds or
substitute new collateral. It repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner . . . and other cases
which held such arrangements void as a matter of law because the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over the collateral. See O.C. § 8.0-306 (4). Burns, Snead
and Speidel, AN INTRODUcON To THE U.C.C. The Michie Co., Charlottesville, 1964.
55. The Code itself nowhere specifically authorizes or otherwise mentions a "floating
lien:' It is a term devised by those dealing with the Code to designate the combined
effect of several sections, e.g., 8.9-204 with 8.9-312.
56. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 55-143-55-150 (1950).
57. While many practicing attorneys may think of the floating lien as being entirely
alien in Virginia law due to the influence of Lang v. Lee, 24 Va. 410 (1825) which had
held that a floating lien on a shifting stock of goods is invalid as a matter of law (cf.
Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331, 93 S.E. 572 (1917); Vray v.
Davenport, 79 Va. 19 (1884); and Addington v. Etheridge, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 436 (1855)],
the Va. Code has, since 1944, at least to factors and suppliers recognized a shifting or
floating lien on inventories of merchants. Thus in 55-146 it is said: ".... Purchasers for
value from the borrower in the usual course of business shall take free of the lien
created by this chapter whether they know of the lien or not. When the goods or
merchandise . . . are sold in the ordinary course of business of the borrower, such lien
shall attach without further act . . . to the accounts receivable or proceeds of such sale
in the hands of the borrower."
58. See discussion supra note 56.
59. Benedict v. Ratmer, 268 U.S. 353, 45 S. Ct. 566, 69 L.Ed. 991 (1925)-a decision
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transactions, many Virginia attorneys are already familiar with operations taken under the contra view taken by the Code.
Besides the extension of the doctrine allowing a lien on a'shifting stock
of goods already recognized by the Factor's Acts to all security transactions, the Code has made one further change in connection with the
"floating lien" concept which is a major departure from prior law. That
is the complete about face it takes in regards to a security interest in
after-acquired property.
Formerly, under sec.

5 5-10 5"°

it was deemed that a subsequent pur-

chase of property by the debtor would not be effected in any way by
"the record of a deed or contract made by a person... before he acquired tide of record." 61 Now, however, under section 8.9-312 (which
replaces sec. 55-105) it is specifically stated that as long as the transaction meet certain conditions (including the requirement that it not
be for an antecedent debt) 62 a creditor may make a loan validly secured
"in whole or in part by after-acquired property ..... 63
The effect of these changes is considerably to expand the horizons
of potential secured transactions by allowing a party who may have a
significant lack of liquidity in re his capital account, to either obtain
credit which he otherwise could not obtain by hypothecating any given
class or classes of property which he might in the future acquire, or
to increase his liquidity by allowing a direct lien on property which he
otherwise could not afford to subject to the restrictions formerly imposed on property subject to such security interests. At the same time,
however, it may very well allow a creditor to "tie up" not only all the
assets presently owned by the debtor, but also any that he may acquire
in the future."
It should be noted, however, that though the "floating lien" does
considerably broaden the potential scope of secured financing in perunder Federal Bankruptcy Act by Mr. Justice Brandeis, purporting to state the law of
New York.
60. VA . CODE ANN., 5 55-105 (1950).
61. Ibid.
62. VA. CODE ANN., 1 8.9-108 (1950).
63. id., § 8.9-312 (3) and (4); cf. § 8.9-204 which states "Subsections (1) and (3)
read together make clear that a security interest arising by virtue of an after acquired
property clause has -qual status with a security interest in collateral in which the
debtor has rights at the time value is given under the security agreement." VA. CODE
ANN., § 8.9-204, 1950.
64. It is hard to determine at this time what effect Federal Bankruptcy laws may
have on this insofar as its potential effect on the law of fraudulent conveyances. It
would appear that this particular aspect of the Code will have to await the interpretation of the U. S. Supreme Court for a definitive rule.
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sonal property, it is highly complex and has many ramifications which,
though too extensive for adequate treatment in a paper of this scope,
must be thoroughly understood before used, and even then, if the
same result can be achieved by the use of one of the more stable security
devices it would probably be advisable to stay with the latter. 5
It should be further noted in regards to the provisions allowing a
security interest in after-acquired property, that while it is recognized
under the Code, such an interest does not attach until the debtor has
rights in the property; 66 and while the whole idea of after-acquired
property being valid security is new in this particular aspect, it is in
accord with the doctrine long established in Virginia law of real property, i.e., deed by estoppel, a doctrine early recognized in the case of
67
Henry's Ex'r v. Payne as applying to chattels.
MISCELLANEOUS

CHANGES OF WHICH THE PRACTICING ATTORNEY
SHOULD BE AWARE

In addition to the more important changes wrought by Article 9
which are discussed above, there are numerous changes of lesser importance, which, while an ignorance of them is not likely to severely
damage a party operating under the Code (since they are mainly
changes aimed at simplifying the law, and are not intended to be absolute
requirements) a recognition of their existence can make operation under
the Code considerably more efficient and successful.
AGRICULTURAL SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

One of the first of these miscellaneous changes is the class dealing
with crop liens and other agricultural security interests. While it is
true that a landlord's lien is specifically excluded from the operation
of the Code, such is not the case for liens taken on crops.6 Generally
the law under the Code remains the same as it was under prior law.0
65. See supra note 53.
66. VA. CoDE ANN., § 8.9-204 (1) (1950).

67. Henry's Ex'r v. Payne, 126 Va. 1, S.E. (1919). In that case where a son had tried
to mortgage a library belonging to his father it was held that the mortgage holder had
no valid security because the son, though he could have expected the library to pass
to him, actually never owned the library. The court pointed out, however: "But this
is permitted at C/L, for independent of a statute, a creditor stands in the shoes of his
"
debtor and can subject no greater rights of property than the debtor . . . has ..
68. See § 812-501; 8.9-109/203, 204 and 401 of the Virginia Code for provisions

specifically applicable to such liens.
69; E.g., In spite of the fact that Virginia law formerly did not recognize a valid
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The only major change as to crop liens is that, while formerly the advancement always had to be within the same year that the crops were
harvested, under the Code the advancement may be had for a longer period of time provided it is coupled with an interest in the real estate
on which the crops are growing. 70 One-other important change in
this area is that under the former law any such advancement on crops
had to be given specifically ".

.

. for the purpose of ...

cultivation of

the crops upon which the lien [was] claimed." 71 Furthermore, anyone
trying to challenge the lien so acquired could require proof that such
funds were actually so used. 72 This limitation is eliminated under the
Code, so that growing crops may now become subject to a valid security interest regardless of the intended use for the advanced funds.
RE-RECORDATION NO LONGER REQUIRED

A second change wrought by the Code which may be limited in
effect, but of some value to note is the abandonment of the re-recordation formerly required in the case where property subject to a chattel
mortgage or deed of trust was moved from one jurisdiction to another.
Under former Virginia law, whenever a security agreement in the
nature of either one of these devices was made in another state and
later removed to Virginia, the agreement had to be re-recorded in Virginia in order for it to be valid as against a subsequent purchaser or lien
holder in Virginia." Thus under the former law, a distinction had to
be made as to whether the article had been actually removed to Virginia, or was merely passing through,74 and the problem was even more
acute due to the fact that under the former view 75 there was no grace
period for recordation.7"
Under the Code, this problem is easily met, by the laying down of
a flat four month rule which requires that all such interests kept within
security interest in after acquired property, by reason sec. 43-27 of the Virginia Code
a specific exception was made for seeded or growing crops.
70. VA. CoDE ANN., S 8.9-204 (4) (a) (1950).
71. VA. CODE ANN, § 43-27 (5) (1950).
72. Ibid.
73. VA. CODE ANN., § 55-99 (1950).
74. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 72, 92 S.E. 2d 359 (1956);
see also: American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. J. W. Perry Co, 152 Va. 598, 601, 148
S.E. 806 (1929).
75. VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-104 (1950).
76. Thus, one having any security interest in any such property necessarily ran the
risk of having to determine whether the property was in fact "removed" to Virginia
and having his interest lost if he did not decide correctly or in time.
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Virginia more than four months must be recorded to remain valid beyond that period.77 Since, for the most part, this new rule does not
include security interests which, created on property outside the State
and subsequently brought in, which would not have come under the
old rule anyway, it does not create any significant new burdens. It
does, however, require that any party seeking to establish his own lien
on any property, recently removed from another state, which may have
been subject to such an interest there, to either check for recordation of
such an interest in such other state, or wait at least four months from
the date of such removal in order to be absolutely certain of his rights.
SPECIFIC APPLICATION-AREAS

OF THE

LAW LEFr UNCHANGED

BY THE CODE

In carrying out is basic purpose (as set forth above), the Code not
only has attempted to change security law in areas where there were,
under prior law, unnecessary restrictions and/or complications, but it
has also been careful to leave unchanged those areas of security law
which would not appear to need reform. These include the laws in
which: 1) the value of consistency and/or public policy within the individual state outweighs the value of conformity among the statese.g., security interests in real property; 2) the former security law has
proven best able to handle peculiar to situations that it was specifically
designed to handle-e.g., equipment trusts in railway rolling stock; and
3) the security law among the states is already uniform and/or could
not be changed by unilateral state action due to Federal pre-emption in
the particular field, e.g., the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.
The changes which have come about in Virginia security law from
the adoption of the Code are not nearly as numerous or complex as they
might appear from the extent of comment that has and will be focused
upon it. The areas left unchanged by the Code for organizational purposes may best be arranged in two classifications: 1) those covered by
the provisions of Article 9 that remain the same as prior law; and 2)
those which remain the same because of their exclusion from the provisions of the Code.
AREAS COVERED BY THE CODE BUT REMAINING THE SAME

It is difficult at this early stage to be able to accurately project all of
the changes that may possibly be made by court construction of the
77. VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-103 (1950).
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Code. 78 There are, however, several areas which, though they might
appear to be potentially troublesome, are actually handled in much
the same way under the Code as they have been tinder prior law.
CONTINUATION OF DISTINCTIONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED
TO SECURITY LAW

One of these areas is the distinction usually made between "goods and
chattels" and choses-in-action. Under the Code, the doctrine laid down
in 1st Natl Bank of Richmond v. Hollandm which held that "choses-inaction" or other intangible assets were not to be treated, as one in the
same with "goods and chattels" under the various property law provisions calling for special handling of the latter 8°--will continue in full
force. It is true that both choses-in-action and "goods and chattels" will
be treated as subjects of a valid security agreement, and as such will be
equally subject to Article 9. This does not mean, however, that the
two are merged into one entity or that the old doctrine of Jusdem
generis is abandoned. It simply means that they will be subject to ihe
same law when they are subjects of such security agreements.81
The Continuationof PoliciesEstablished Under Virginia'sFactor'sActs
Another area covered specifically by the Code but which will remain
generally unchanged-except for an extension of rules formerly governing it to other security interests-will be found in the field of factor
financing.
As to coverage, while it is true that the Code extends the concept of a
lien on-a shifting stock of goods to all other consensual security interests (with the exclusions mentioned under sec. 8.9-104), it in no way
eliminates any such interests which formerly would have come under
Virginia's Factor's Acts.
Under these acts, Virginia has recognized at least partially the "float78. Supra note 19.
79. 1st Nat'1 Bank of Richmond v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 503-507, 39 S.E. 126 (1901).

80. The case in 1st Nat'l Bank (supra) dealt with the question of whether delivery
necessary to complete a gift from a husband to his wife was achieved in view of the
statute which made delivery of goods and chattels incomplete when transferred from
one person to another both parties living under the same roof, and the "goods and
chattels" never left the house.
81. "Under subsection 8.9-102 (2) all security interests created by contract are within
the scope of 8.9. In accordance with this provision, choses-in-action may be used for
security, but this approach does not affect the Virginia holdings that choses-in-action
are not 'goods and chattels.' "-VA. CoDE ANN. (1950).
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ing lien" concept which is one of the more famous and least understood
aspects of commercial financing under the Article."2 The only difference between the Code in this area, and the "floating lien" type of
provisions in Virginia's Factor's Acts, is that this security device, long
used in connection with factor financing, has been made available to
most other security transactions.
In addition to the continuation and expansion of the provisions allowing for the acquisition of a lien on after-acquired property, it should
be noted that the requirements for proper notice laid down for such liens
by the Factor's Acts are followed fairly closely in the requirements for
such notice under the Code, the only difference being that the requirements under the Code, if anything, are simpler. Thus, under the
Factor's Acts the notice must contain: a) the name of the factor, b) the
name under which the factor does business, c) the principal place of
business of the factor within the state, and d) the names and addresses
of the major parties to the business. In addition the notice must contain the name of the borrower and whatever interest he may have in the
merchandise; and finally it requires a statement as to the general character of the items which are now or may become subject to the lien and
the period of time over which the particular financing arrangement is
3
to extend.
Under the Code, as under these present provisions, the agreement
must be signed by the debtor, and must contain the general description
of the security which reasonably identifies the collateral. (As to the
other requirements listed above, the Code, in its endeavors to simplify
84
such financing transactions, has eliminated them altogether.)
Prioritiesin Secured Transactions Basically the Same Under Article 9
Again as to secured transactions, the law under the Code, while
possibly more elaborate in the case of provisions concerning priorities
than under prior law, remains basically the same.
82. See Burton, Factor's Lien and Accounts Receivable Financing and Article 9, 20
W & L LAw REv. 306 (Fall 1963). "If a writing so provides, the factor has a continuing
lien on all the goods and merchandise of the borrower on all loans made from time to
time [VA. CODE ANN, sec. 55-144, 19501. As soon as a notice of this agreement has been

recorded, the lien is valid and covers after acquiredproperty of the borrower [emphasis
supplied]."
"The lien is effectual from the time it is admitted to record against all later claims
against the merchandise except common law and statutory liens."
83. VA. CODE ANN., § 55-144 (1950).
84. VA. CoDE ANN., § 8.9 (1950).
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Under the Code, an interest that has attached is perfected when
the financing statement is admitted to record. The artisan's possessory
lien arising by operation of law is superior to even a perfected security
interest. If the financing statement covers the proceeds from the sale
of collateral the security interest continues in such proceeds. All these
rules are substantially the same as in [the prior Virginia law]. s5
Even where the Code is significantly different from prior Virginia
priorities, e.g., the landlord's lien, such priorities are generally unaffected
by the operation of the Code since they are expressly excluded from
its operation."
Security Interests in Fixtures Basically Unchanged
Finally, among those interests which are covered, but which will be
handled basically in the same way as under prior law are those security
interests in goods which may become fixtures. Thus in sec. 8.9-313 of
the Code, subsection (1) the basic definition of fixtures which may be
subject to a security interest is in accord with the prior Virginia law
set down in Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook.87 Likewise, subsection
(2) is in accord with prior Virginia law as to security interests taken
in fixtures subsequent to a mortgage on the realty, but prior to their
becoming affixed to the realty. 8
85. Burton, op. cit., Cf. VA. CODE ANN., sec. 8.9-302 (1), 8.9-310, 8.9-307 (1), 8.9-306
(2) (1950), with VA. CODE ANN., § 55-146 (1950)].
86. VA. CODE ANN., § 8.9-104 (1950).
87. Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S.E. 1070 (1909). In this case
it was held the intent of the parties was such as to make certain machinery installed
in a laundry subject to a security interest (a chattel mortgage) and where the machines
were not so constructed so as to become a part of the realty (even though they could
be so constructed) and the security interest were properly recorded, that a vendee or
mortgagee of realty, with notice (actual or constructive) of the rights of third parties
in the machines would take subject to such rights. Cf. "The rules of this section do not
apply to goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, ...
glass . . . and the like and no security interest in them exists under this title unless
the structure remains personal property under applicable law. The law of this State
other than this act determines whether and when other goods become fixtures....
VA. CODE ANN., sec. 8.9-313 (1) (1950).
88. Under the prior Virginia rule, where the Williamsburg Knitting Mill Co. had
installed an automatic sprinkler system in its plant subject to a chattel deed of trust,
but the deed of trust was not recorded according to Virginia law, it was held-after
the knitting mill had taken out bankruptcy and the note holder under an earlier deed
of trust on the realty and any property "that may be acquired and placed upon said
premises during the continuance of this trust" claimed priority on the sprinkler systemthat where a security instrument on real estate, even though purporting to cover afteracquired property is made not on faith of certain specific property which is later
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SECURITY INTERESTS NOT COVERED BY THE CODE

In section 8.9-104 there are listed eleven items which are specifically
excluded from the provisions of Article 9.89 These include: 1) any
security interest which is subject to any Federal statute to the extent
that such statute affects the rights of any parties involved;90 2) any landlord's lien; 3) any lien given by law for services or materials; 9 ' 4) any
transfer of assignment for any form of compensation received by an
employee for his services; 5) an equipment trust covering railroad
rolling stock; 6) a sale of commercial paper whose purpose is for
collection only; 7) a transfer of assignment of any insurance interest;
8) any right of set-off; 9) any right represented by judgment; 10) any
lien on or in real property; & 11) any claim arising from tort, or
banking or savings transactions.
There are various reasons following the basic philosophy of the Code
as to why these eleven specific financing transactions are excluded from
the Code,92 but regardless of why they may be excluded, the important
matter in the context of this paper is that as regards these eleven transactions, Article 9 does not apply, and therefore the prior law governing
them remains in effect (unless, as in the case of commercial paper,
they are governed by another section of the Code.)
acquired and affixed to the land, and a later security instrument, even though not properly
recorded, was made on the faith of the fixture, the later will prevail. [See Holt v.
Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).] The theory of this doctrine was that the recording acts
are to protect those who make advancements on the basis of certain specific property
as opposed to those who make advancements which incidentally will cover general
property which later may or may not be acquired. This same rule and theory is to be
carried forward under the Code.-See VA. CODE ANN., op. cit. S 8.9-313 (2).
89. VA. CODE ANN., op. cit., § 8.9-104.
90. E.g., the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.
91. It is to be noted that though this subsection does cover such liens to the extent
that they are given priority over any security interest gained under the provisions
of the Code, the purpose of this limited coverage is to assure that the law of mechanic's
lien-so closely tied to State public policy-is unaffected by the adoption of the Code.
Cf. Code sec. 8.9-310.
92. While it may be difficult at first glance to understand why some of these security
interests are excluded, the reasoning behind their exclusion becomes evident when taken
in context with the philosophy of the Code. Thus, the excluded interests are generally
such if they fall into one of three general classifications: 1) those already covered by
other articles of the Code or other legislation which has the effect of unifying the law
among the several states; 2) those areas in which the individual states have historically
had a greater interest, and the value of consistency within the State outweighs the need
for conformity among the states; or 3) a sort of middle ground which may be combined
with either the first or second or both or which are only indirectly connected with
the law governing actual security transactions.
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In addition to those secured transactions specifically excluded from
the operation of the Code by sec. 8.9-104, there are several other areas
of commercial security law which, because of their nature as being
merely ancillary to the main question of giving and/or receiving a
security interest in personal property, appear to remain outside the
provisions of, Article 9 and therefore are unchanged. These include
various regulatory statutes formerly connected with financing arrangements, successive assignments of the same funds, true leases, and various
mechanic's liens.
Ray Henson points out that "Article 9 does not replace regulatory
legislation such as the usury statutes, the consumer finnace acts or retail installment sales act . . ." 93 Hence in sec. 8.9-203 it is stated
that an transaction which may subject to the Code and which is also
subject to the Virginia laws governing small loan companies and small
loan transactions-94 or to the Virginia statute prescribing certain minimum requirements for contracts for the regulation of installment sales
of personal property; 5 would in the case of conflict be governed by
the regulatory statutes rather than the Code;9 6 as would occur in cases
where the Code came into conflict with the Virginia law regulating
97
the installment sales of motor vehicles.
"Similarly, successive assignments of the same deposit of money...
which are not intended to create security interests are not within the
scope of title 8.9... ." "I Thus the decision in Evans v.Joyne 99 will
not be changed by the operation of the Code, and Virginia's rule in
such cases of "first in time, first in right" will still control.
In addition, the law laid down in Southern Dairiesv. Coopera 0 where
it was held that where an arrangement was meant to be a true'lease and
there was no intention by either party that the lease be a mere security
device'' the court will apply the law of bailment and not that of
security to any controversy arising out of the agreement-is carried forward by the Code. Thus:
93. Henson, supra note 21.
94. VA. CODE Ax.;. 1950, §§ 6-275-6-338.
95. VA. CODE AN-. 1950 (1964 Repl Vol.), § 11-4.
96. VA. CODE AiNN. 1950 (1965 Added Vol.), § 8.9-203 (2).

97. VA. COD. ANN. 1950 (1958 Rep'l Vol.), § 46.1-545.
98. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 (1965 Added Vol.), §8.9-102, Official Comment.
99. See Evans v. Joyner, 195 Va. 85, 77 S.E. 2d 420 (1953).

100. Southern Dairies v. Cooper, 35 F. 2d 439, 440 (4 C.C.A. 1929).
101. Here, a lease was made to a confectioner by an ice cream firm of a freezer
unit which was to be used to store ice cream supplied by the lessor under an agreement
that the lessee should purchase a certain quantity of ice cream a year, or pay rent based
on the ('Pfciercv.
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The U.C.C. in title 8.9 only covers transactions "intended" to create
a security interest in personal property. Consequently the section
is in accord [with former Virginia cases] in its holding that true
leases, not bailment leases, are not security transactions, and so would
not be within the scope of Article 9.102
In brief, the job of acclimatizing oneself to the changes made in
Virginia security law by the operation of Article 9 of the Code may be
made much easier if one remembers that the ultimate effect of the
article is to leave unchanged the law governing the liens of landlords
and farmers for advances to tenants and laborers, 10 3 the liens of livery
stable keepers, 104 innkeepers, and materialmen's liens, laundries, dry
cleaners and garagemen' 0 5 mechanic's and materialmen's liens, 10 6 liens
of franchises and property of transportation and similar enterprises, 107
and any wage assignments. 0 8
IN SUMMATION

At least several decades before the Code was thought of, the idea
was accepted that a debtor could hypothecate some or even all of his
personal property. To accomplish that purpose unnder the pre-Code
law the debtor had to execute a number of different instruments and
often do so at different times. Under the Code he can do the same thing
with one instrument. To the extent that the requirements for different
forms were intended to discourage the use of chattel security the Code
does mark a change in social philosophy-but only to that extent. To
the extent that the state has expressed its social thinking in specific statutes such as those on usury, requirements for disclosure of finance
charges, and the like the adoption of the Code means no change. 1°9
As to substantive changes in the law the security and financing capabilities of the single security interest, there is hardly any difference from
those available under the old security devices, i.e., it doesn't open any
broad new roads to capitalization or secured transactions, but it does
have considerable advantages precedurally speaking over the multitudinous devices and minute technicalities required under the old system. n °
102.
103.
104.
105.

VA. CODE ANN., op. Cit., § 8.9-102 Official Comment.
§ 43-29-43-30.
§ 43-31-43-40.
§ 43-1-43-26.

106. Ibid.
107. § 55-161-55-167.

108. Ibid.
109. Coogan, op. cit., p. 696.
110. As to substantive changes in the law the security and financing capabilities of
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In short, the changes wrought by the adoption of Article 9 in the
Virginia law of secured transactions, are neither profound nor particu-

larly burdensome. Those changes that are made, generally have the
effect of greatly liberalizing security law and guaranteeing that the
intent of parties acting in good faith will be carried out. The Code
is basically so drafted that anyone operating even in ignorance of the
Code's provisions can generally be assured of succeeding in his purpose.

On the other hand, for those who take the time to master even the
most general changes made by the Code, it should make transactions
involving secured interests considerably easier, and more effective.

S. Strother Smith

Single Security interest can hardly be differentiated from those available under the old
security devices, i.e., it doesn't open any broad new roads to capitalization or secured
transactions, but it docs have considerable advantages procedurally speaking over the
multitudinous devices required under the old system.
"Under the old law a debtor could effectively hypothecate all of his currently owned
tangible and intangible personal property, but not with one instrument (unless state law
permitted the use in one piece of paper of two or more separate security devices). He
could secure a loan through a security interest in his fixed assets only through a chattel
mortgage, unless it was the kind of property practically capable of being physically
pledged. The conditional sale could cover the same kind of collateral but only in a
transaction which resulted in the debtor's purchase of that collateral. In many states
a chattel mortgage could theoretically have covered inventory as well as fixed assets
but the mechanical requirements of description, recording, etc. made it practically
unavailable. . . . The Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the factor's lien acts are by
their terms limited to inventory (and accounts receivable and chattel paper produced
through its sale. . . . The accounts receivable statutes, of course, could cover only
accounts. Each of these devices has its own set of rules for execution, filing, priorities
and remedies.' (Coogan, op. cit. at 695, 96).

